Networks, Asset Pricing, and Financial Intermediation.


Regulating Financial Networks Under Uncertainty [PDF, Oct 21 2019]

I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when there is uncertainty regarding its precise structure. I show that such uncertainty reduces the scope for welfare-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can improve welfare. The size and composition of such a set crucially depend on the interplay between (i) the (expected) susceptibility of the network to contagion, (ii) the cost of improving network transparency, (iii) the cost of regulating institutions, and (iv) investors' preferences.

Firm Networks and Asset Returns [PDF, Feb 1 2018] [Revise and Resubmit, The Review of Financial Studies]

Changes in the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks along firm networks are important to understanding variations in asset returns. When calibrated to match key features of supplier-customer networks in the United States, an equilibrium model in which investors have recursive preferences and firms are interlinked via enduring relationships generates long-run consumption risks. Additionally, the model matches cross-sectional patterns of portfolio returns sorted by network centrality, a feature unaccounted for by standard asset pricing models.

Imperfect Information Transmission from Banks to Investors: Macroeconomic Implications [PDF, July 2019] [Accepted for publication, Journal of Monetary Economics] (joint with Oksana Leukhina and Nicolás Figueroa)

We study the interaction of information production in loan-backed asset markets and credit allocation in a general equilibrium framework. Originating banks can screen their borrowers, but can inform investors of their asset type only through an error-prone rating technology. The premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of screening effort. Because the rating technology is imperfect, this premium is insufficient to induce the efficient level of screening. However, the fact that banks know their asset quality and produce ratings accordingly helps keep the premium high. Mandatory rating, certified review, and mandatory ratings disclosure policies interfere with this decision margin, thereby reducing informativeness of high ratings, lowering the premium paid on them, and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem.


Pricing in Funding Networks: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market with Mark Paddrik and Matthew McCormick

Interbank Networks and Banking Regulation with Zafer Kanik